Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather
like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of
individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the
rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is
a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working
of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern
political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how
they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors''
objective is to understand the workings of alternative political
institutions so that choices among such institutions rules can be
more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of
constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The
Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political
order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative
criteria for such choices might be established.
目錄:
1. The constitutional imperative
2. The contractarian vision
3. The myth of benevolence
4. Modelling the individual for constitutional analysis
5. Time, temptation, and the constrained future
6. Politics without rules, I: Time and non-constrained collective
action
7. rules and justice
8. Politics without rules, II: Distributive justice and
distributive politics
9. Is constitutional revolution possible in democracy?