Chronology
The Epistle Dedicatory
The Epistle to the Reader
BOOK I: Of Innate Notions
Chapter
I Introduction
II No Innate Principles in the Mind
III No Innate Practical Principles
IV Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles, both
Speculative and Practical
BOOK II: Of Ideas
Chapter
I Of Ideas in General, and their Original
II Of Simple Ideas
III Of Ideas of One Sense
IV Of Solidity
V Of Simple Ideas of Divers Senses
VI Of Simple Ideas of Reflection
VII Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection
VIII Some further Considerations concerning our Simple Ideas
IX Of Perception
X Of Retention
XI Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind
XII Of Complex Ideas
XIII Of Simple Modes; and first, of the Simple Modes of Space
XIV Of Duration, and its Simple Modes
XV Of Duration and Expansion, considered together
XVI Of Number
XVII Of Infinity
XVIII Of other Simple Modes
XIX Of the Modes of Thinking
XX Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain
XXI Of Power
XXII Of Mixed Modes
XXIII Of our Complex Ideas of Substances
XXIV Of Collective Ideas of Substances
XXV Of Relation
XXVI Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations
XXVII Of Identity and Diversity
XXVIII Of Other Relations
XXIX Of Clear and Obscure, Distinct and Confused Ideas
XXX Of Real and Fantastical Ideas
XXXI Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas
XXXII Of True and False Ideas
XXXIII Of the Association of Ideas
內容試閱:
Chapter I
Introduction
§1. An inquiry into the understanding, pleasant and useful. Since
’tis the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible
beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion, which he has
over them; ’tis certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth
our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst
it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of
itself: and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and
make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties, that lie
in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much
in the dark to ourselves; sure I am, that all the light we can let
in upon our own minds; all the acquaintance we can make with our
own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us
great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other
things.
§2. Design. This, therefore, being my purpose to inquire into the
original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with
the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent; I shall not
at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or
trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what
motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to
have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our
understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any,
or all of them, depend on matter or not. These are speculations,
which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying
out of my way, in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my
present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as
they are employed about the objects, which they have to do with:
and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the
thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical,
plain method, I can give any account of the ways, whereby our
understandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and
can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the
grounds of those persuasions, which are to be found amongst men, so
various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted
somewhere or other with such assurance, and confidence, that he
that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their
opposition, and at the same time, consider the fondness, and
devotion wherewith they are embraced; the resolution and eagerness,
wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect,
that either there is no such thing
as truth at all; or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain
a certain knowledge of it.
§3. Method. ’tis therefore worth while, to search out the bounds
between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in
things, whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate
our assent, and moderate our persuasion. In order whereunto, I
shall pursue this following method.
First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions,
or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and
is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby
the understanding comes to be furnished with
them.
Secondly, I shall endeavour to show, what knowledge the
understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and
extent of it.
Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of
faith, or opinion; whereby I mean that assent, which we give to any
proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain
knowledge: and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons
and degrees of assent.