CHAPTER ONE Introduction
1.1 Overview and Objectives
1.2 Research Questions
1.3 Significance of the Study
1.4 Organisation of the Study
CHAPTER TWO Theory Review
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Dispersed Ownership and Agency Conflict
2.3 Concentrated Ownership and Theories for Ownership Discrepancy
2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Concentrated Ownership
2.5 Private Benefits of Control
2.5.1 What Are Private Benefits of Control?
2.5.2 Defence of Private Benefits of Control
2.6 Group Affiliation and Internal Markets
2.7 Summary
CHAPTER THREE Institutional Background
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Reform of SOEs and Share Issue Privatisation
3.3 State Ownership and Agency Conflict
3.4 Equity Division Share Split Structure
3.5 Legal and Institutional Infrastructure
3.6 Listing Quota and RPTs
3.7 Summary
CHAPTER FOUR Literature Review
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Definitions of Tunnelling and Propping
4.3 Consequences of Tunnelling and Propping
4.3.1 Consequences of Tunnelling
4.3.2 Consequences of Propping
4.4 Studies on Tunnelling
4.5 Summary
CHAPTER FIVE Hypotheses Development
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Tunnelling Hypotheses
5.3 Propping Hypothesis
5.4 Value Effects of Tunnelling and Propping
5.5 Summary
CHAPTER SIX Research Design and Methodology
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Sample Selection
6.3 Variable Definition
6.3.1 Definition of RPTs
6.3.2 Definitions of Control Rights, Controlling Shareholder, Ownership Type and Pyramid
6.3.3 Definition of Other Blockholders
6.3.4 Definition of Investment Opportunity
6.3.5 Definition of Firms in Financial Distress
6.3.6 Definition of Firm Performance
6.3.7 Measurement of Control Variables
6.4 Empirical Models
6.5 Summary
CHAPTER SEVEN Results and Discussion
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Descriptive Statistics
7.3 Test of Regression Assumptions
7.4 Regression Results and Discussion
7.4.1 Evidence of Tunnelling and Propping
7.4.2 Effect of Tunnelling and Propping on Operating Performance
7.4.3 Effect of Tunnelling and Propping on Firm Valuation
7.5 Robustness Test
7.5.1 Control Rights Threshold
7.5.2 Relationship between Tunnelling, Propping and ST
7.5.3 Endogeneity of Ownership, Tunnelling and Propping Variables
7.6 Limitations
7.7 Summary
CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusions and Policy Implications
8.1 Conclusions
8.2 Implications of Findings
8.3 Avenues for Future Research
References
Appendix 1 A Typical State Owned Pyramidal Structure in China
Appendix 2 A Typical Private Controlled Pyramidal Structure in China
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